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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on noteworthy opinions issued by Georgia
appellate courts between June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014 that are
relevant to the practice of construction law.' Because condominium
projects often result in construction-defect litigation, this Article also
briefly discusses an amendment to section 44-3-106(h) of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), part of the Georgia Condominium
Act, which became effective July 1, 2014.

II.

ARBITRATION

Archer Western Contractors, LLC v. Holder Construction Co.2 is a
Georgia appellate case arising out of the now familiar tragic death of
Mack Pitts, a subcontractor's employee on the Atlanta airport's
International Terminal project. The Pitts estate received a large
judgment against the sub-subcontractor and its employee that exceeded
the sub-subcontractor's automobile liability insurance coverage.3
The estate then sued the City of Atlanta, the general construction
manager, and the construction manager's subcontractor, alleging that
they had failed to require the sub-subcontractor to maintain at least $10
million in automobile liability insurance as required by both the general
contract and the subcontract. The construction manager was a joint
venture composed of Holder Construction Company, Manhattan

* Shareholder in the firm ofWeissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel for Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (BA,
1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown, Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 65 MERCER L. REV.
67 (2013).
2. 325 Ga. App. 169, 751 S.E.2d 908 (2013).
3. Id. at 171, 751 S.E.2d at 911.
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Construction Company, C.D. Moody Construction Company, and Hunt
Construction Group. The subcontractor was also a joint venture
composed of Archer Western Contractors and Capital Contracting
Company.4
Earlier Georgia appellate cases from 2011 to 2013 that arose from the
estate's claims focused on whether Pitts was a third-party beneficiary of
the contract's insurance provisions, including those incorporated into a
Phase 2 subcontract between the construction manager and the
subcontractor.5 On remand from the Georgia Supreme Court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals ultimately determined that Pitts was a thirdparty beneficiary.'
The principal issue in the current court of appeals case was whether
an arbitrator or judge should decide the res judicata effect of an
unappealed part of the trial court's order, which was entered in
December of 2010 before the series of appeals mentioned above.7 The
unappealed part of the order granted summary judgment to the
subcontractor on the construction manager's cross-claim that the
subcontractor had breached its duty under the Phase 2 subcontract to
indemnify the project manager pertaining to the estate's claims.'
In December 2011, a year after the summary judgment order, the
construction manager notified the subcontractor that it would withhold
further payments to the subcontractor under the Phase 3, but not the
Phase 2 subcontract until conclusion of the Pitts litigation. The
construction manager withheld future payments because of the
subcontractor's breach of its contractual duty in the Phase 2 subcontract
to ensure that the sub-subcontractor carried the requisite insurance.9
In response to the withholding of payment, the subcontractor filed suit
in state court seeking a declaration that the res judicata effect of the
trial court's December 2010 summary judgment order on the construction manager's indemnity claim prevented the construction manager
from withholding funds under the Phase 3 subcontract. The construction
manager then notified the subcontractor of its election to arbitrate under
the arbitration provision of the Phase 3 subcontract. Thereafter, the
construction manager filed motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment

4.
5.
App.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 169, 751 S.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 171, 751 S.E.2d at 911; see generallyEstate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta, 323 Ga.
70, 74, 746 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2013).
Estate of Pitts, 323 Ga. App. at 70, 72, 746 S.E.2d at 699, 700.
Archer W. Contractors,LLC, 325 Ga. App. at 169, 171, 751 S.E.2d at 910, 911.
Id. at 171, 751 S.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 171-72, 751 S.E.2d at 911.
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suit and to compel arbitration. ° The trial court granted those motions,
reasoning that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA)" and
related federal law, the res judicata effect of the trial court's December
2010 judgment was for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide. 12
First, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
the FAA applied.1" Relying on federal case authority that it found
persuasive, the court then determined that, while gateway issues about
whether an arbitration provision is valid or covers a claim are for the
court to decide unless the parties have clearly agreed otherwise, res
judicata is not a gateway issue and is therefore for an arbitrator to
decide.14 It analogized res judicata defenses to waiver, laches, and
estoppels defenses, which are also for arbitrators to decide.15
The court acknowledged that in Bryan County v.Yates Paving &
Grading Co., 16 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a res judicata

defense should be decided by the trial court. 17 However, it distinguished Bryan County from the current case because Bryan County had
been decided under the rubric of the Georgia Arbitration Code" rather
than the FAA.' 9
In Miller v.GGNSC Atlanta, LLC,2 ° the court of appeals addressed,
as a matter of first impression, whether the FAA allows a substitute
arbitrator to be named when the parties' chosen arbitration forum in a
consumer contract has failed or is otherwise unavailable. 21 The court
reasoned that the FAA does allow a substitution if the selection of a
particular forum was merely an ancillary logistical concern, but it does
not if that selection was an integral term of the agreement. 22
In this case, the court held that the designation of the chosen
arbitration provider was integral to the arbitration agreement because
the agreement expressly stated that any dispute "shall" be resolved
"exclusively" through arbitration conducted in accordance with the
designated arbitration provider's code of procedure, which, in turn,

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 169, 171-72, 751 S.E.2d at 910, 911-12.
U.S.C. tit. 9 (2012).
Archer W. Contractors,LLC, 325 Ga. App. at 172, 751 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 172-73, 751 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 174-75, 751 S.E.2d at 913-14.
Id. at 175, 751 S.E.2d at 913.
281 Ga. 361, 638 S.E.2d 302 (2006).
Archer W. Contractors,LLC, 325 Ga. App. at 175, 751 S.E.2d at 914.
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1 to -18 (2007 & Supp. 2014).
Archer W. Contractors,LLC, 325 Ga. App. at 175-76, 751 S.E.2d at 914.
323 Ga. App. 114, 746 S.E.2d 680 (2013).
Id. at 114, 118-19, 746 S.E.2d at 682, 685.
Id. at 119-20, 746 S.E.2d at 685-86.
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specified that only the chosen arbitration provider could administer the
arbitration."3 Because the arbitration provider could no longer perform
arbitrations because of a consent judgment it had entered into in
response to a lawsuit by the Minnesota Attorney General alleging
deceptive practices, the court determined that the arbitration provision
This decision suggests that parties to
was impossible to enforce.'
contracts with arbitration provisions may wish to expressly authorize the
court's appointment of an alternative arbitration forum in the event the
designated arbitration forum becomes unavailable.
III.

COMMON LAW ALLOCATION AND INDEMNIFICATION

Allocation, contribution, and indemnification are important principles
in construction disputes. In DistrictOwners Ass'n v.AMEC Environmental & Infrastructure,Inc.,25 the plaintiff filed a premises-liability action
against a property owner for injuries he sustained when he jumped off
a wall that concealed a thirty-three-foot drop between the wall and the
parking deck. The owner filed a third-party complaint against the
designers and builders of the wall and the parking deck for common-law
indemnification and common-law apportionment.26 The trial court
granted the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment on the ground that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-332' barred
the owner's claims. The owner appealed that decision.28
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on the commonlaw indemnification claim.29 The court stated that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
does not bar indemnity claims by one who is vicariously liable for the
negligence of another.3 9 However, it does bar the claims asserted by
the owner, which were against third-party defendants as joint tortfeasors
for any 31amount that the owner is ultimately found liable to the
plaintiff.
The court also affirmed the trial court's holding on the common-law
apportionment claim, reasoning that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 abrogated that
32
cause of action, including third-party claims asserting it.

The court

23. Id. at 120-21, 746 S.E.2d at 686.
24. Id. at 116, 125, 746 S.E.2d at 683, 689. See also Sunbridge Retirement Care
Associates, LLC v. Smith, 326 Ga. App. 550, 757 S.E.2d 157 (2014), for a similar holding.
25. 322 Ga. App. 713, 747 S.E.2d 10 (2013).
26. Id. at 713, 747 S.E.2d at 11.
27. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2014).
28. Dist. Owners Ass'n, 322 Ga. App. at 713, 747 S.E.2d at 11.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 715-16, 747 S.E.2d at 13.
31. Id. at 716-17, 747 S.E.2d at 13.
32. Id. at 717, 747 S.E.2d at 14.
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also called into doubt the continued viability of its reasoning in Murray
v. Pate133-which allowed third-party claims for common-law contribution-in light of the Georgia Supreme Court's Couch v. Red Roof Inns,
Inc. decision.35
IV. GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
In Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. HDI-GerlingAmerica Insurance
Co.,3 the Georgia Supreme Court provided three answers to two
certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relating
to a standard commercial general liability policy. 37 The first was that
the term "occurrence"-the event necessary to trigger coverage under a
policy-does not require damage to the property or work of someone other
than the insured.3' The court quickly noted that this does not necessarily mean that coverage will exist because the policy contains many
exclusions, including "business risk" exclusions.39 The second was that
in most circumstances, a claim for fraud, as defined by Georgia law, is
incompatible with the notion of "accident'-a defined element of an
"occurrence"-and will not, therefore, involve an "occurrence" or
coverage.4 ° The third was that in many cases an "occurrence" might be
found in the context of a breach of warranty claim, but actual coverage
for breach of warranty claims will generally be limited to cases involving
breach of a warranty of non-defective property, because liability for
breach of the warranty of defective property would not involve "damages
because of property damage to the nondefective property."'
V.

CONTRACT TERMINATION

Hope Electric Enterprises, Inc. v. Schindler Elevator Corp.42 arose
from a general contractor's termination of a subcontract due to the
subcontractor's alleged safety violations. The subcontract provided, in
part, that if the subcontractor "repeatedly" failed to perform in
accordance with the subcontract, the general contractor could, following
a ten-day cure period, terminate the subcontract. After the general

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

304 Ga. App. 253, 696 S.E.2d 97 (2010).
291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
Dist. Owners Ass'n, 322 Ga. App. at 718, 747 S.E.2d at 14.
293 Ga. 456, 746 S.E.2d 587 (2013).
Id. at 456, 746 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 460, 746 S.E.2d at 591.
Id. at 460-62, 746 S.E.2d at 591-92.
Id. at 466, 746 S.E.2d at 594-95.
Id. at 466-67, 746 S.E.2d at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted).
324 Ga. App. 859, 752 S.E.2d 5 (2013).
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contractor terminated the subcontract for alleged repeated violations, the
subcontractor sued. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
general contractor and the subcontractor appealed.4"
The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that the term "repeatedly," as
used in the subcontract, was an indistinct and uncertain term because
the subcontract provided no reference point to determine what constituted a "repeated" failure to perform, how many failures justified a
termination, or that considerations beyond the mere number of
violations, such as temporal proximity and total period of the subcontractor's work, were relevant to that determination." Therefore, the court
determined that "repeatedly" was ambiguous.4 5 Consequently, the
court concluded, a jury should determine whether the subcontractor had
"repeatedly" violated the subcontract, and, as a result, the trial court
46
erred in granting summary judgment to the general contractor.
VI.

SURETY RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In Georgia Departmentof Correctionsv. Developers Surety & Indemni41
ty Co. ,4 the court of appeals addressed an issue of first impression.
The Georgia Department of Corrections (the Department) declared a
roofing contractor in default and invoked the payment and performance
bonds that Developers Surety and Indemnity Company had provided on
behalf of the contractor. The surety then filed suit against the
Department, alleging that the Department had breached the roofing
contract and requesting a declaratory judgment that the surety had no
obligations under the bonds. The Department responded that the
surety's claim was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court
rejected that argument and granted summary judgment to the surety,
and the Department appealed.49
The court of appeals affirmed the decision, noting that an action for
50
breach of contract is one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity.
The court reasoned that the surety was subrogated to the contract rights
of the roofer once the bonds were invoked and that the surety therefore
1
stepped into the shoes of the roofer for those contract rights.5 In short,

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 859-61, 752 S.E.2d at 6-7.
Id. at 862, 752 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
Id. at 860, 862, 752 S.E.2d at 7, 8.

47. 324 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 697 (2013) cert. granted.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 375, 750 S.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 371-72, 750 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 372, 374, 750 S.E.2d at 698, 700.
Id. at 374-75, 376, 750 S.E.2d at 700, 701.
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because sovereign immunity would not bar a suit by the roofer against
the Department, it would not bar the surety's suit.5
VII.

PROOF OF CODE VIOLATIONS

Champion Windows of Chattanooga,LLC v. Edwards58 arose from a
homeowner's counterclaims against the builder of her home. At trial,
the homeowner's expert testified that various alleged defects did not
meet "code requirements." The trial court ruled in the homeowner's
favor.54 The court of appeals held that the homeowner had failed to
prove code violations because she was required to either introduce the
applicable codes or offer expert testimony that specific code sections had
been violated.55
VIII. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta 6 was addressed in last year's
Construction Law article." The Pitts litigation addressed the rights of
an unnamed, but allegedly intended, third-party beneficiary under a
general contract and subcontract, and was closely monitored by
construction law members of the Georgia Bar.5" Thus, it merits noting
that the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari from this latest
decision.5 9
IX. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In a very significant decision for condominium construction-defect
litigation, Thunderbolt HarbourPhase II Condominium Ass'n v. Ryan, °
the court of appeals addressed the breach of fiduciary duty claims of a
condominium association against its sole officer and director, who
appeared to have been appointed to those positions by the developergeneral contractor of the condominium project.
The association
contended that the defendant failed to adequately inspect and repair
construction defects, maintain adequate insurance, and maintain the

52. See id.
53. 326 Ga. App. 232, 756 S.E.2d 314 (2014).
54. Id. at 232-33, 240-41, 756 S.E.2d at 316, 320-21.
55. Id. at 241, 756 S.E.2d at 321.
56. 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013), cert. denied.
57. Brown, supra note 1, at 73-76.
58. See generally id.
59. Archer W. Constr. Ltd. v. Estate of Pitts, No. S13C1718, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 163 (Feb.
24, 2014); Holder Constr. Co. v. Estate of Pitts, No. S13C1732, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 161 (Feb.
24, 2014).
60. 326 Ga. App. 580, 757 S.E.2d 189 (2014).
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condominium project. 61 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendant on the basis that "Georgia law did not recognize a
fiduciary duty to turn over common areas of [the condominium] in good
3
repair." 2 The association appealed.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a jury issue existed on
whether the defendant had a fiduciary duty to the association to
64
In reaching that
properly maintain the condominium project.
the corporation
owe
decision, the court noted that officers and directors
a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty, which requires that they act with the
65
The
utmost good faith toward the corporation and its stockholders.
court also noted that in the management of corporate property, officers
and directors "are charged with serving the interests of the corporation
as well as the stockholders."6 ' In addition, the court stated that an
agent has a fiduciary relationship with its principal and that a jury
7
could determine that the defendant was an agent of the association.
X.

ATTORNEY FEES

6
In Benchmark Builders,Inc. v. Schultz, " the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed a provision in a home construction contract providing for
69
recovery of attorney fees for the prevailing party. At trial, the jury
ruled against the plaintiff-builder on its claim for specific performance
of the construction contract and its claim in the alternative for damages
for breach of the contract. Alleging that the house was not constructed
per the contract, the homeowners counterclaimed for the return of their
earnest money, for the value of light fixtures they had purchased and
installed in the house, and for attorney fees resulting from the breach.
The jury returned a verdict for the homeowners on their claims, but did
not award monetary damages to the homeowners on either of the first
two claims. Nevertheless, the jury awarded the homeowners $16,555 on
7°
The court of
the claim for attorney fees. The builder appealed.

61.
62.

Id. at 580, 581, 757 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 580, 757 S.E.2d at 190.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 582, 757 S.E.2d at 191.

65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Enchanted Valley RV Park Resort, Ltd. v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415,
423, 526 S.E.2d 124, 131 (1999)).

67. Id.
68. 294 Ga. 12, 751 S.E.2d 45 (2013).
69. Id. at 13, 751 S.E.2d at 46.
70. Id. at 12-13, 751 S.E.2d at 45-46.
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appeals affirmed, 7' and the supreme court granted certiorari to
determine whether the "prevailing party" language of the subject
contract permitted an award of attorney fees to the homeowners,
even
72
though they had not recovered other money damages or relief.
The attorney fee provision of the subject contract stated,
If any action at law or in equity... is brought to enforce or interpret
the provisions of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled
to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the other party, which fees
may be set by the court in the trial or appeal of such action or may be
enforced in a separate action brought for that purpose and which fees
73
shall be in addition to any other relief which may be awarded.
Because of the italicized language, the supreme court stated that the
court of appeals had correctly determined that the contract provided for
a separate and distinct claim for attorney fees, which was not ancillary
74
to the recovery of other damages or relief, but in addition to it.
Therefore, the homeowners were the prevailing parties entitled to the
awarded attorney fees even though the jury had awarded them no
damages. 5
The supreme court contrasted the contract language in this case with
the contract language addressed in Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc. v.
75
Imaging Systems International.
In Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., the
contract simply provided, "In the event any proceeding or lawsuit is
brought by [Magnetic Resonance or its customer] in connection with the
Agreement, the prevailing party in such proceeding shall be entitled to
receive its . . . reasonable attorney's fees. 77 Based on that language,
the supreme court had ruled that 7attorney fees could not be recovered
absent other relief to the plaintiff.
XI.

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION'S RIGHT TO PURSUE CLAIMS

In the past, condominium developers have often drafted condominium
declarations to bar construction-defect actions by the condominium

71. Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz, 315 Ga. App. 64, 66, 726 S.E.2d 556, 558
(2012).
72. Benchmark Builders, Inc., 294 Ga. at 13, 751 S.E.2d at 46.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 13-14, 15, 751 S.E.2d at 46, 47.
Id. at 13-14, 751 S.E.2d at 46.
Id. at 14-15, 751 S.E.2d at 46-47; see also Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc. v. Imaging

Systems Int'l, 273 Ga. 525, 543 S.E.2d 32 (2001).

77. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., 273 Ga. at 525, 543 S.E.2d at 33 (second alteration
in original).

78. Id. at 529, 543 S.E.2d at 36.
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association and have vested those claims in the unit owners. They have
done this for several reasons. One is that the unit owners are the actual
owners of the common elements in a condominium project. 9 Thus, it
makes some sense for them to have the claims. Two, the developers do
not want to be potentially subject to suit by both the unit owners, as
owners, and the association, as the entity responsible for maintenance
of the common elements. Three, developers wanted to make it more
difficult for associations to pursue construction-defect claims.'
Courts have upheld these declaration provisions against construction
actions by associations despite O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(h), 81 which since
1990 has expressly stated,
The association shall have the capacity, power, and standing to
institute, intervene in, prosecute, represent in, or defend, in its own
name, litigation, administrative or other proceedings of any kind
concerning claims or other matters relating to any portions of the units
or common elements which the association has the responsibility to
administer, repair, or maintain. 2
To prevent condominium developers from continuing to include these
restrictions on association rights to pursue construction-defect and other
legal actions, the Georgia General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 44-3106(h) in 2014"' by adding the following language at the end:
[A]nd such capacity, power, and standing shall not be waived, abridged,
modified, or removed by any provision of any contract or document,
including the condominium instruments, that were recorded, entered
into, or established prior to the expiration of the period of the
declarant's right to control the association as set forth in subsection (a)
of Code Section 44-3-101.84
This amendment will likely increase the number of condominium
construction-defect claims following the next cycle of condominium
development.

79. See generallyPhoenix on Peachtree Condo. Ass'n v. Phoenix on Peachtree, LLC, 294
Ga. App. 447, 669 S.E.2d 229 (2008).
80.

See generally id.

81.

O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(h) (2010 & Supp. 2014).

82.

Id.; see generally Phoenixon Peachtree Condo. Ass'n, 294 Ga. App. 447, 669 S.E.2d

229.
83.
84.

Ga. H.R. Bill 820, Reg. Sess. (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(h); see also O.C.G.A. § 44-3-101(a) (2010 & Supp. 2014).

